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Abstract 
We study how information sharing between banks influences the geographical clustering of 
branches. We construct a spatial oligopoly model with price competition that explains why 
bank branches cluster and how the introduction of information sharing impacts clustering. 
Dynamic data on 59,333 branches operated by 676 banks in 22 countries between 1995 and 
2012 allow us to test the hypotheses derived from this model. Consistent with our model, we 
find that information sharing spurs banks to open branches in localities that are new to them 
but that are already relatively well served by other banks. Information sharing also allows firms 
to borrow from more distant banks. (105 words) 
Key words: Information sharing, branch clustering 
JEL codes: D43, G21, G28, L13, R51 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, banks across the world have adjusted their branch networks in 
response to regulatory changes, increased competition, and progress in information and 
communication technologies. Figure 1 illustrates the resulting time variation in the number of 
bank branches across a variety of countries. It also shows that more recently many American 
and European banks have pruned their branch networks in the aftermath of the Great Recession. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
What cannot be seen in Figure 1 is that these dynamics did not play out in a geographically 
uniform way within countries. Banks increasingly cluster together as they close branches in 
sparsely populated areas while opening new ones in economically stronger centers. For 
example, of the 600 UK branch closures between April 2015 and April 2016, over 90 percent 
were in areas with a below-median household income. In contrast, about two-thirds of all 
branch openings occurred in wealthier neighborhoods (Reuters, 2016). A similar trend can be 
observed in the United States, where branch clustering is mirrored by an increase in “banking 
deserts”: localities entirely devoid of bank branches (Morgan, Pinkovsky and Yang, 2016).1 
Despite this increase in geographic (spatial) clustering, hardly any theoretical or empirical 
research exists on the drivers of branch location. The scarce existing literature on the 
determinants of the spatial clustering of bank branches is either of a rational or behavioral 
nature (Deller and Sundaram-Stukel, 2012). Clustering is rational when locating near other 
banks generates external economies of scale or when the demand for banking services is 
spatially clustered itself (Brown, Guin and Kirschenmann, 2015). In contrast, behavioral 
explanations regard clustering as the result of “groupthink” or of banks following first-movers 
in an informational cascade model. Due to reputational concerns, bank managers may open a 
new branch in a neighborhood with pre-existing branches rather than in virgin territory. In line 
                                                          
1 Nguyen (2015) finds that (merger-related) branch closures in the US cause prolonged declines in small-business 
lending and employment growth. These impacts are highly local and dissipate within six to eight miles. 
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with such herding, Chang, Chaudhuri and Jayaratne (1997) find that branch openings follow 
existing branches even if this hurts the profitability of the new branch. 
Both explanations for geographical branch clustering are hard to test empirically. For 
instance, it is challenging to evaluate current and expected credit demand across regions. 
Moreover, bank managers are compensated based on multiple criteria so that branch locational 
decisions are hard to evaluate separately. It is also problematic to directly measure and compare 
banks’ informational awareness. 
The main contribution of our paper is to build a spatial oligopoly model that explains branch 
clustering behavior and that yields testable hypotheses about the impact of information sharing 
on the equilibrium level of clustering. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to develop 
such a stylized model in which bank branch clustering arises in an intuitive way. 
Our model revolves around an entrepreneur who needs credit to expand her business. She 
needs to visit a bank branch and talk to a loan officer to know whether she will get a loan or 
not. Suppose the probability of getting a loan from any local bank branch is 20 percent. 
Moreover, assume that the success probabilities across different bank branches are unrelated.2 
If the entrepreneur visits a locality with only one bank branch, the probability of getting a loan 
is 20 percent. Yet, if another locality has six bank branches, then the probability of getting a 
loan is almost   742.011 6  percent. Given this much higher probability, the entrepreneur 
will be tempted to visit the second locality. At the same time, the higher inter-bank competition 
in this locality will lower banks’ lending rates and profit margins. An important intuition of our 
model is therefore that while branch clustering increases the size of the local banking market 
(market-size effect), inter-bank proximity also implies more vigorous competition (price-
cutting effect). If the first effect dominates, bank branches earn higher profits by locating closer 
to each other so that they can attract more clients. If the second effect dominates, banks will 
try to decrease competition by dispersing their branches geographically. 
From this theoretical framework, we derive predictions about the impact of a reduction in 
information asymmetries between banks and borrowers on branch clustering. As information 
asymmetries increase with distance, geographical credit rationing makes it difficult for 
                                                          
2 We relax this assumption later so that success probabilities are correlated across banks. 
3 
 
entrepreneurs to successfully apply for a loan at a branch that is further away (Petersen and 
Rajan, 2002; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). Such distance constraints are less binding when 
banks can credibly share information about loan applicants, either voluntarily through private 
credit bureaus or mandatorily through public credit registries. In our model, information 
sharing therefore allows banks to lend to more distant entrepreneurs. We derive four testable 
hypotheses. 
First, our model predicts that information sharing increases bank branch clustering and 
competition because banks can attract distant borrowers that were previously too opaque to 
lend to. Second, the model predicts that the likelihood that banks open a new branch in a 
locality where they already operate branches declines, because adding more branches to the 
same locality will not make it a more attractive ‘shopping’ destination. Third, information 
sharing spurs domestic banks (that rely on proprietary information) to cluster, while it helps 
foreign banks (that mainly use publicly available information) to expand into new localities. 
Finally, information sharing synchronizes different banks’ loan-approval decisions and hence 
dampens the market-size effect of clustering. Our model accordingly predicts that when 
information sharing becomes more effective, branch clustering gradually becomes less 
pronounced. 
To empirically test our model, we use detailed bank branch data – geographical coordinates 
and the dates of establishment (and sometimes closure) of each branch – from 22 Eastern 
European countries. Our sample covers 59,333 branches that were active within the period 
1995-2012. The data set further contains information on the banks that own these branches, 
which enables us to distinguish between branches of domestic versus foreign banks. 
Eastern Europe constitutes a natural testing ground for our model because information 
asymmetries are pervasive while creditor rights remain relatively weak (Brown, Jappelli and 
Pagano, 2009). Moreover, many Eastern European countries institutionalized information 
sharing among lenders – either through a public credit registry or a private credit bureau – 
during our sample period. We use the introduction of such information-sharing regimes as 
country-level exogenous shocks that push banks towards a new clustering equilibrium. This 
4 
 
setting can also provide insights into how bank clustering may respond in more developed 
banking markets to similar but slower improvements in borrower transparency. 
In terms of methodology, we implement a differences-in-differences approach to evaluate 
the impact of the introduction of information sharing in some countries compared with other 
sample countries where information sharing had not yet been introduced. This strategy enables 
us to mitigate selection biases and, by allowing for country and time fixed effects, alleviates 
concerns about omitted variables. 
By way of preview, we find that information sharing has a strong positive effect on bank 
branch clustering and that this impact is larger for domestic banks. Information sharing makes 
it more likely that banks open new branches in localities where they did not yet operate but 
where other banks were already present. The analysis of additional Kompass data on bank-firm 
relationships shows that, in line with a reduction in geographical credit rationing, information 
sharing allows firms to borrow from more distant banks. Lastly, we find that clustering 
becomes less pronounced over time in countries with more effective information sharing 
systems. All these findings are in line with our theoretical predictions. 
This paper contributes to three strands of the literature. First, there is a clear lack of research 
that theoretically explains and empirically identifies the fundamental determinants of the 
physical location of bank branches. In contrast, a rich empirical literature exploits plausibly 
exogenous spatial variation in bank branches – reflecting historical ‘quirks’ or waves of 
financial deregulation – to identify the impact of bank density on various outcomes.3 While 
useful for identification, one ought to bear in mind that outside of these specific settings, 
branches are unlikely to be spread quasi-randomly across space. Moreover, the limited 
literature that does investigate banks’ decisions concerning their branch network mainly 
focuses on the size of these networks rather than their geographical distribution. 4  Our 
                                                          
3 See Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Beck, Levine and Levkov (2010), Rice and Strahan (2010), Kroszner and 
Strahan (2014), and Favara and Imbs (2015) for the US; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), Herrera and Minetti 
(2007) and Benfratello, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (2008) for Italy and Berkowitz, Hoekstra and Schoors (2014) 
for Russia. 
4 Cerasi, Chizzolini and Ivaldi (2002) and Cohen and Mazzeo (2010) investigate the impact of competition on 
the size of branch networks. Temesvary (2015) shows theoretically and empirically that locational market power 
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contribution is to develop a simple and intuitive framework in which banks rationally trade off 
the market-size and price-cutting effects of geographical clustering. We then test our model 
predictions in a rich international context, using the introduction of information sharing as 
country-level shocks that push banks towards a new clustering equilibrium. 
Second, we add to the literature on the economic impacts of information sharing. 
Theoretical contributions explore how information sharing reduces moral hazard and adverse 
selection, improves loan quality, and lowers interest rates (Padilla and Pagano, 1997; 2000). 
On the empirical side, cross-country evidence indicates that information sharing is associated 
with more lending to the private sector, fewer defaults and lower interest rates (Jappelli and 
Pagano, 2002). Recent evidence suggests that (voluntary) private credit bureaus tend to be more 
effective than (mandatory) public registries in this regard (Martinez-Peria and Singh, 2014). 
Yet, it remains unclear exactly how information sharing affects bank behavior. We uncover an 
important mechanism: the central availability of borrower information leads to different 
equilibrium levels of branch clustering which may be associated with less spatial credit 
rationing.5 
Third, our findings add to the industrial organization literature on firm location. This 
literature asserts that customers trade off the utility they derive from products and the 
geographic distance to the firms where they can buy these products. As a result, firms have 
greater market power when they are closer to their customers. This literature starts with the 
Hotelling (1929) model where firms compete and price their products in geographic locations 
along a line of fixed length. Salop (1979) introduced a circle model on which firms are located 
and compete. Much sophistication has been built into such models over the years. Syverson 
(2004), for example, extends the Salop model to allow for heterogeneous producer costs and 
adds asymmetric information among producers about their production costs. Our assumptions 
are less stringent than those in the Salop (1979) model that is used extensively in the literature 
                                                          
allows banks with larger branch networks to charge an interest-rate premium, while Coccorese (2012) incorporates 
branch decisions in a price competition model. 
5 Van Cayseele, Bouckaert, and Degryse (1994) analyze theoretically the effect of sharing ‘negative’ borrower 
information about past defaults and ‘positive’ information about indebtedness on the number of branches per bank. 
Unlike our paper, the authors do not analyze the spatial distribution of branches. 
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on bank competition (see Barros, 1999; Dell'Ariccia, 2001 and Kim, Lozano-Vivas and 
Morales, 2007). In our model, borrowers are uniformly distributed on a two-dimensional plane 
and banks can cluster in a locality (in contrast to the Salop model where banks are equidistant). 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple spatial oligopoly model of branch 
clustering after which Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 then sets out our methodology 
and Section 5 reports the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical model 
2.1. Model intuition and construction 
We develop a spatial oligopoly model to formalize the trade-off between the market-size and 
price-cutting effects of bank clustering. 6  Specifically, we determine both the number of 
entrepreneurs who visit a locality to apply for credit (the market size) and the equilibrium loan 
rate prevailing in that locality (the price).7 
In our model, both entrepreneurs and banking localities (towns or cities) are uniformly 
distributed across a two-dimensional plane. Each entrepreneur has identical project returns r 
and wants to obtain a single loan for which she can apply by travelling to any locality with at 
least one bank branch. Entrepreneurs face a probability p of not obtaining a loan when applying. 
This probability is correlated across branches with correlation φ. We assume this correlation is 
the same for different localities. 
Loan size is homogeneous across entrepreneurs and normalized to one. Entrepreneurs need 
to pay the commuting cost to their locality of choice and this cost equals the distance times a 
positive transportation cost coefficient t. In addition, entrepreneurs pay the equilibrium loan 
rate prevailing in this locality if they successfully obtain a loan there. 
                                                          
6 We build on Konishi (2005) who models the spatial concentration of retail stores. 
7 To ensure tractability, we assume that depositors put all their savings in the nearest bank branch and that the 
introduction of information sharing has no impact on the deposit market, a market much less affected by 
information asymmetries. Our focus on credit granting as a key banking activity is consistent with much of the 
literature (e.g., Stein, 2002; Berger and Udell, 2006; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006, among many others). An 
interesting exception is Park and Pennacchi (2009) who concurrently model credit granting and deposit taking. 
We leave the spatial modelling of the information derived from observing checking account turnover, for example, 
for future research. 
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We assume there are two nearby bank localities d and s as well as a more distant bank 
locality w. Each entrepreneur visits at most one of these three localities to apply for a loan. We 
focus on branch clustering in locality d, treating as given the situation in localities s and w. 
The model consists of three stages. In Stage I, banks open a finite number of branches 
across localities on the two-dimensional plane. They cluster branches based on expected profits. 
In Stage II, entrepreneurs observe the locations of the branches and consequently receive a 
signal about the loan rate in each locality.8 They now decide, based on the expected return of 
borrowing in each locality, which locality to visit. The expected return depends on the distance 
to the locality (and the associated transportation costs), the probability of successfully applying 
for a loan there, and the interest rate in case the borrower receives credit. Each entrepreneur 
visits at most one locality: the one that in expectation gives the highest (positive) net return. If 
no locality yields a positive expected return, the entrepreneur does not apply for a loan. 
Critically, without information sharing among banks, information asymmetries between 
entrepreneurs and banks cause a discrete distance threshold beyond which the probability p of 
an unsuccessful loan application is 1. Stated otherwise, due to geographical credit rationing 
entrepreneurs know for sure that they will be rejected when applying for a loan at branches 
beyond the distance threshold.9 Only below this threshold does the entrepreneur face the usual 
rejection probability p<1 and trades off the higher transportation costs of more distant localities 
against the higher probability of receiving a loan (at a relatively low cost) in distant localities 
with more branches. 
Finally, in Stage III of the model, bank branches in the same locality compete the loan rate 
down to a local equilibrium level.10 We assume that bank branches grant loans at zero marginal 
                                                          
8 The local loan rate depends on the number of branches and hence the intensity of bank competition. 
9 According to the president of the Italian Bankers’ Association “the banker’s rule of thumb is to never lend to a 
client located more than three miles from his office” (quoted in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004). The median 
Belgian SME borrower in Degryse and Ongena (2005) is located 2.5 kilometers (1.6 miles) from the lending 
branch. In U.S. data analyzed in Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) this median 
distance is 3.7 km (2.3 miles) and 4.2 km (2.6 miles), respectively. 
10 We assume that the equilibrium lending rate is determined by within-locality competition and is unaffected by 
distant banks. See Ho and Ishii (2011) for empirical evidence on this account. 
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cost. We proceed by backward induction and start by Stage III. In locality d with k bank 
branches the equilibrium loan rate is: 
 
𝑖𝑑 = 𝑖0 + 𝑖1 𝑘⁄                                (1) 
 
Where 𝑖𝑜 stands for the minimum loan rate and 𝑖1 is the oligopoly rent that banks can extract 
from nearby borrowers. With more bank branches, the equilibrium loan rate decreases in line 
with the price-cutting effect of branch clustering. 
To determine the probability that a loan application is rejected, we start from the case of 
two bank branches. The probability of rejection at the first and the second branch both equal p 
and the probability is correlated across branches with correlation φ. Because of this 
interdependence (different banks possess partially overlapping information about the same 
borrower), when a borrower gets rejected by one bank branch, the rejection probability is also 
higher in another branch. Therefore, the joint probability of rejection at both branches equals 
(Gupta and Tao, 2010): 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(2) = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑝 + 𝜑 ∗ √𝑝 ∗ 𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝑝) ∗ (1 − 𝑝) = 𝑝2 + 𝜑 ∗ 𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝑝)     (2) 
 
In the case of three branches, we can compare the third branch with the first two branches while 
treating those first two as one unit. The joint probability of rejection at all three branches then 
equals: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(3) = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(2) + 𝜑 ∗ √𝑝 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(2) ∗ (1 − 𝑝) ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(2))      (3) 
 
Likewise, if there are k bank branches in locality d, then the joint probability of rejection in 
locality d is: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘) = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘 − 1) + 𝜑 ∗ √𝑝 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘 − 1) ∗ (1 − 𝑝) ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘 − 1))  (4) 
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Then in Stage II, given the expected loan rates in each bank locality, an entrepreneur decides 
which locality to visit by maximizing the expected profit: 
 
𝐸𝑃𝑑 = (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘))(𝑟 − 𝑖𝑑) − 𝑡 ∗ 𝑅                  (5) 
 
Where R is a threshold distance or radius between the borrower location and locality d. If we 
assume that there is no overlap between localities d and s, then the marginal entrepreneur 
should satisfy 𝐸𝑃𝑑 = 0 and we have: 
 
𝑅𝑛𝑜 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝
∗ = (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘))(𝑟 − 𝑖𝑑) 𝑡⁄                  (6) 
 
We can also generalize the model to allow for competition among nearby bank localities: that 
is, the market areas of locality d and s overlap. We assume that around locality d there is an 
infinite number of localities s. The distance between all these localities s and locality d is m. 
Each locality s has the same number of bank branches j. The expected profit in locality s is 
then: 
 
𝐸𝑃𝑠 = (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑗))(𝑟 − 𝑖𝑠) − 𝑡(𝑚 − 𝑅)                 (7) 
 
The equilibrium loan rate at locality s equals: 
 
𝑖𝑠 = 𝑖0 + 𝑖1 𝑗⁄                             (8) 
 
Assume that locality d and s are close enough so that the expected profit of visiting each locality 
is positive. The borrowers then compare the expected profit of both options and the marginal 
borrower is indifferent between locality d and s: 
 
𝐸𝑃𝑑 = 𝐸𝑃𝑠                              (9) 
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This gives us the radius R of locality d: 
 
𝑅𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝
∗ = [(1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘))(𝑟 − 𝑖𝑑) − (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑗))(𝑟 − 𝑖𝑠)] 2𝑡⁄ + 𝑚/2     (10) 
 
Therefore, all entrepreneurs for whom the distance to d is less than R choose to go to locality 
d to apply for a loan. In other words, the market area for locality d encompasses a circle around 
locality d with the above radius. If all bank branches in locality d equally share the total market, 
then the market size of each branch in locality d is: 
 
𝑆𝑑 = (𝜋 ∗ 𝑅
2) 𝑘⁄ = [(1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘))(𝑟 − 𝑖𝑑) 𝑡⁄ ]
2/𝑘            (11) 
The expected profit of each branch in locality d is then: 
 
𝐸𝑑 = 𝑆𝑑 ∗ 𝑖𝑑                             (12) 
 
Finally, in Stage I, banks determine the clustering of their branches based on expected profits. 
They will not open a branch in locality d if the expected profit is below the expected profit of 
opening a stand-alone branch in a new locality. 
In our model, branch clusters increase an entrepreneur’s expected return for two reasons: a 
higher chance of getting a loan and loans being cheaper. These advantages may be (partially) 
offset if the locality is distant and transportation costs are high. There also exists a trade-off for 
the bank. On the one hand, branch clustering increases the local market because entrepreneurs 
prefer denser banking markets (the market-size effect). On the other hand, branch density and 
the associated competition reduce loan rates (the price-cutting effect). This trade-off 
determines the optimal level of clustering and makes the relationship between clustering and 
the expected profit of a branch follow an inverse U-shape. Denser branching initially leads to 
higher profits as the positive market-size effect dominates the negative price-cutting effect. 
After some optimum, however, opening another branch in a locality drives down profits as the 
price-cutting effect more than offsets the increase in market size. 
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In the absence of information sharing, entrepreneurs can only apply for a loan in nearby 
localities d and s. Due to geographical credit rationing the loan-rejection probability in distant 
locality w is 1. However, when information sharing is introduced the entrepreneur can also 
choose to apply for a loan in locality w. The establishment of information sharing thus increases 
competition in each banking locality and decreases the market size. Banks in nearby localities 
now have more incentives to cluster their branches in order to attract (or retain) borrowers who 
may be tempted to travel to a distant locality and apply there. 
Assume there are n branches located in distant locality w and there is a strictly positive 
additional cost component c. These costs include higher expenses due to long-distance travel 
as well as agency costs that result from the serious information asymmetries between bank 
branches and very distant entrepreneurs. The marginal entrepreneur who chooses the far-away 
locality w should hence satisfy: 
 
𝐸𝑃𝑛 = (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑛))(𝑟 − 𝑖𝑛) − 𝑐 ≥ 0                 (13) 
 
Note that with information sharing, the inter-branch correlation of the probability that an 
entrepreneur cannot get a loan at any branch may also increase. This is because different 
branches now have similar public information about a borrower. This reduces the benefit of 
branch clustering and decreases the market-size effect. 
If the transaction cost c is sufficiently small, then the fraction of entrepreneurs that still 
visits bank locality d declines. The marginal entrepreneur who is indifferent between going to 
locality d and locality w should satisfy: 
 
𝐸𝑃𝑑 = 𝐸𝑃𝑤                              (14) 
 
This gives us the new radius R, which should be strictly positive. This implies that there are 
still some borrowers who visit bank locality d to get a loan: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔
∗ = [(1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘))(𝑟 − 𝑖𝑑) − (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑛))(𝑟 − 𝑖𝑛) + 𝑐] 𝑡⁄ ≥ 0    (15) 
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Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the situation without overlap between the market areas of 
locality d and nearby locality s. The larger circle in light grey represents the market area of 
locality d and s before information sharing, while the smaller dark circle is the market area 
afterwards. The market size shrinks as some entrepreneurs – those already at the outer margins 
of localities d and s – decide to apply for a loan in locality w. Figure A2 depicts the situation 
with competition among nearby localities. The dashed line around locality d represents all the 
possible nearby localities s. 
 
2.2. Hypothesis development 
We provide a few numerical illustrations to our simple model. We assume that the probability 
of loan rejection is 70 per cent, both the minimal loan rate and the oligopoly rent is 2 percent, 
the project return is 10 percent, the transaction cost coefficient equals 1 per cent and the 
commuting cost of applying for a loan in the distant locality w is 6. There are 10 bank branches 
in this distant locality. We first assume that with information sharing, the correlation among 
bank branches of a loan rejection stays at 0.2. Figure 2 shows the numerical results. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
The comparative statics in the top panel show that before the establishment of information 
sharing, banks cluster together until there are six branches in locality d. The expected profit of 
each branch is still higher than the expected profit of operating alone. Adding a seventh branch 
would, however, push expected profit below the level that could be had when opening this 
branch in a new locality instead. 
The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows that after the establishment of information sharing 
(which introduces competition from distant bank localities) branch clustering increases 
significantly to 16 (until the profit of operating alone is higher than with clustering). The 
introduction of information sharing reduces spatial credit rationing, increases competition, and 
decreases the market size. Banks in nearby localities now have more incentives to cluster their 
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branches to attract (or retain) borrowers who may be tempted to travel to a distant locality and 
apply there. 
Figure 3 shows the numerical results when nearby localities compete with each other. The 
comparative statics in the top panel show again that our model predicts a certain amount of 
bank clustering. According to the panel at the bottom of Figure 3, clustering increases from 4 
to 14 branches in locality d once information sharing is introduced (we assume that the number 
of branches in locality s is 20 and that the distance m between locality d and s is 12). That is, 
the increase in clustering happens regardless of whether there is overlap in nearby banking 
markets. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
In short, information sharing among banks impacts the equilibrium level of branch 
clustering as it eliminates the distance threshold beyond which entrepreneurs cannot 
successfully apply for loans. When borrower information is shared, entrepreneurs can in 
principle apply in each locality – as long as transportation costs are not prohibitive. Realizing 
this, banks start to cluster in order to attract more distant entrepreneurs that are in search of 
deeper credit markets in which they can apply for a loan from a wider variety of banks. This 
yields our first testable hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: After the introduction of information sharing, different banks increasingly 
cluster their branches in the same localities. 
 
Our model also predicts that banks exploit the opportunities of sharing borrower information 
by extending their branch network to localities where adding a branch of their own increases 
the number of different banks that entrepreneurs can choose from. In contrast, adding more 
branches of the same bank in a locality where this bank is already present does not make this 
locality a more attractive ‘shopping’ destination for (distant) entrepreneurs because loan 
rejection rates are perfectly correlated among branches of the same bank. That is, if an applicant 
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gets rejected by a branch of Bank A it will get rejected by all branches of Bank A in the same 
locality. This impact is more important after the introduction of information sharing when 
attracting and retaining borrowers becomes more vital. Our second hypothesis is therefore: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: After the introduction of information sharing, banks are more likely to open 
new branches in localities with no (or few) pre-existing own branches.  
 
Third, our model implies that information sharing can affect domestic and foreign banks 
differently if these banks rely on other lending technologies. Domestic banks often rely on 
long-term lending relationships during which they exploit proprietary borrower information 
whereas foreign banks focus on transactional lending based on publicly available information 
(Mian, 2006 and Beck, Ioannidou, and Schäfer, 2017). This means that in the absence of 
information sharing, distance thresholds due to informational asymmetries can bind more for 
domestic banks. In our model, this amounts to borrowers facing a higher agency cost c when 
applying at a domestic bank branch as compared with an equidistant foreign branch (recall that 
c comprises both agency and travel costs). The introduction of information sharing then affects 
domestic banks more because the overall reduction in c is larger, leading to an increase in 
domestic bank clustering in particular. 
Figure 4 illustrates this prediction with numerical results. We assume that prior to 
information sharing the cost of long-distance lending was higher for domestic (6.5) than for 
foreign banks (6.2). This reflects that relationship lending by domestic banks involves higher 
distance-related agency costs. With information sharing, the cost of screening distant clients is 
equalized at 6 as both bank types can now use the credit registry or bureau. This change is 
larger for domestic banks (-0.5) than for foreign banks (-0.2). The model shows accordingly 
that the clustering response is stronger for domestic banks (both with and without overlap 
among nearby localities). Our third hypothesis is therefore: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The impact of information sharing on bank clustering is stronger for domestic 
banks. 
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[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
Finally, the impact of information sharing on branch clustering depends on how effective the 
information-sharing system works. We already know that information sharing increases the 
correlation between different banks’ loan decisions. As a matter of fact, the effectiveness of 
information sharing and related loan decision correlations can be so high that this induces a 
negative market-size effect and a decrease in bank branch clustering. 
To see this in our calibration exercise, we gradually increase the correlation from 0.2 to 
0.3 and compare equilibrium clustering (Figure 5). The horizontal axis shows the correlation 
among banks in loan rejection decisions (a higher correlation indicates a more effective 
information-sharing system) and the vertical axis shows bank branch clustering in equilibrium. 
We indeed observe that when lending decisions across banks become increasingly correlated, 
there is a decline in the market-size effect and therefore in branch clustering. Our fourth and 
final hypothesis is therefore: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Information sharing increases branch clustering but this relationship turns 
negative once the effectiveness of information sharing – as measured by the interbank 
correlation in lending decisions – becomes sufficiently high. The relationship between the 
effectiveness of information sharing and branch clustering consequently displays an inverse 
U-shape. 
 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
3. Data 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of our dependent variables (branch data) and independent 
variables. Appendix Table A1 provides all definitions.11 
 
                                                          
11 Appendix Table A2 contains a correlation matrix of all variables. 
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3.1. Branch data 
To test our hypotheses, we require time-varying data on branch locations for countries in which 
information sharing – either through a public credit registry or through a private credit bureau 
– is introduced at different points in time. We therefore collected information on the 
geographical coordinates of 59,333 branches operated by 676 banks across 22 emerging 
European countries.12 These data paint a precise and gradually changing picture – reflecting 
branch openings and closures – of the banking landscape during the years 1995-2012. Figure 
6 shows the geographical branch distribution in these countries at the start and the end of our 
sample. During our sampling period, bank started to gradually cluster more as indicated by a 
17.9 percent increase in the cross-locality Herfindahl-Hirschman index. 
 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
 
Appendix Table A3 summarizes the number of branches that opened or closed by year and 
country: 33,716 (1,365) branches opened (closed) during our sample period. Many new 
branches were established during 2001-07, a period of rapid credit growth. The expansion of 
branch networks slowed down after the global financial crisis when fewer branches opened 
while branch closures (rare before the crisis) accelerated. 
 For each branch, we know the identity of the parent bank. By merging our data with the 
bank ownership data in Claessens and Van Horen (2014) we can distinguish between branches 
owned by foreign and domestic banks. A bank is classified as foreign if at least half of its equity 
is in foreign hands. We further distinguish between greenfield foreign banks (de novo banks 
established from scratch) and take-over banks that were formed when a foreign bank acquired 
a domestic one. 
                                                          
12 A team of consultants with extensive banking experience collected the data by contacting banks or downloading 
data from bank websites. This data-collection exercise was part of the second Banking Environment and 
Performance Survey (BEPS II). For more information, see Beck, Degryse, De Haas and Van Horen (2018). See 
also: 
http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/economics/data/banking-environment-and-performance-survey.html.  
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We take the 33,716 branch openings during our sample period as our main unit of 
observation. 13  This allows us to test whether the introduction of information sharing 
encouraged banks to open branches in different types of localities. Table 1 shows that 
approximately half of all branch openings took place when a country had a credit registry or 
bureau in place (Information sharing). 44 per cent of all branch openings were by a foreign 
bank and about a third of these were by greenfield foreign banks. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Our main dependent variables capture the clustering of banks across countries and over time. 
No. branches all banks measures the number of pre-existing bank branches in the proximity of 
a newly opened branch. For this and all other dependent variables, we use two methods to 
match a new branch with all nearby existing branches. First, we draw circles with a 2 or 5 km 
radius around the geo-coordinates of the new branch and count the number of existing bank 
branches within that circle. Second, we count the number of existing branches within the same 
locality (town or city) as where the new branch is located. Table 1 shows that the median new 
branch is surrounded by 17 pre-existing branches within a 2-km radius, 23 branches within a 
5-km radius, and 25 branches within the same locality. 
 Branch same bank is a dummy that indicates whether the bank that opens a new branch 
already operated one or more branches in the same area (circle or locality). The probability of 
pre-existing branches of the same bank being present is 33 (37) per cent when the surrounding 
area is measured as a circle with a 2 km (5 km) radius and 38 per cent when branches are 
matched by locality. While the median number of pre-existing branches is zero, there is wide 
variation and the average number is three. 
Lastly, we measure local credit market concentration by constructing a Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index (HHI) for each circle or locality around a new branch: 
 
                                                          
13 Our data set contains 59,333 branches (owned by 676 banks) of which 33,716 (owned by 532 banks) opened 
during 1995-2012. The remaining 144 banks did not open branches during this period. 
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𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1                            (16) 
 
Where 𝑠𝑖 stands for the market share, measured in branches, of bank i in the market and N is 
the number of banks. 
 
3.2. Data on information sharing 
Data on the introduction of information-sharing regimes are from the World Bank Doing 
Business database, the EBRD, and on-line sources. Appendix Table A4 shows that during 
1995-2012, fifteen countries introduced a public credit registry and eighteen a private credit 
bureau. There exists substantial variation in the timing of the introduction of information 
sharing which is helpful for our empirical identification. 
The upper chart in Figure 7 shows the average number of pre-existing branches of the same 
bank around newly opened branches in the four years before and the four years after the 
establishment of information sharing at t=0. In line with our second hypothesis, after the 
introduction of information sharing, new branches open in localities where banks have fewer 
pre-existing branches of their own (that is, banks spread out their own branch network). The 
second and third chart show that, in line with our first hypothesis, these new branches tend to 
cluster in more competitive markets (with more existing branches from other banks and hence 
a lower HHI). 
 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
 
Lastly, we measure the quality of the information-sharing regime in a country by means of the 
World Bank Doing Business credit information index. The index ranges from 0 to 6 and reflects 
rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information from 
either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau (higher values indicate more effective 
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information sharing).14 Among our 22 countries the average value of Quality information 
sharing is 1.45 but there is wide variation with a standard deviation of 2.16 (Table 1). 
 
4. Methodology 
To test our hypotheses, we apply a differences-in-differences framework with multiple groups 
(countries) and time periods (Wooldridge, 2007). To test Hypothesis 1, we estimate the 
following benchmark model: 
 
𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡                   (17) 
 
Where i indicates a new bank branch; j the locality in which the new branch opens (circle or 
town/city); c indicates the country and t refers to the year. 𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡 is the number of pre-existing 
branches when branch i opens in locality j (No. of branches all banks). 𝑇𝑐𝑡  (Information 
sharing) is a dummy equal to 1 if banks in country c share borrower information in year t. 𝛼𝑐 
and 𝛼𝑡  are country and year fixed effects. According to our model, 𝛽1 is expected to be 
positive as the introduction of information sharing induces bank branches to cluster so as to 
attract more borrowers. We also run this model with the locality-level HHI index on the left-
hand side (𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡). We then expect 𝛽1 to be negative as smaller information asymmetries 
due to information sharing mean that new branches tend to open in more competitive local 
markets with a lower pre-existing HHI. 
 To test Hypothesis 2, we measure the number of existing branches of the same bank in the 
locality where a branch opens (No. branches same bank): 𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛. We also construct a dummy 
version of this variable (𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛) that is equal to 1 if 𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛 > 0 and 0 otherwise (Branch same 
bank). We run the following regression model:   
                                                          
14 A score of 1 is assigned for each of six features: (1) Both positive credit information (outstanding loan amounts 
and on-time repayments) and negative information (late payments and defaults) are distributed; (2) Data on both 
firms and individuals are distributed; (3) Data from retailers, utility companies, and financial institutions are 
distributed; (4) More than two years of historical data are distributed; (5) Data on loan amounts below 1 percent 
of income per capita are distributed; and (6) By law, borrowers have the right to access their data in the largest 
credit bureau or registry. 
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𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡                   (18) 
 
According to our model, information sharing makes banks less likely to open new branches in 
localities where they already operate branches themselves. We therefore expect 𝛽1  to be 
negative. 
To examine whether information sharing differentially impacts domestic and foreign banks, 
we run interaction regressions. Assuming that domestic (foreign) banks are more oriented 
towards relationship (transaction) lending, we expect domestic banks to be more affected by 
the introduction of information sharing and therefore have more incentives to cluster. Let Fi be 
a dummy equal to ‘1’ if a branch belongs to a foreign bank. The sum of 𝛽1 and 𝛽3 is now 
the treatment effect for foreign banks: 
 
𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡          (19) 
 
Lastly, we investigate to what extent the effectiveness of information sharing matters for 
branch clustering (Hypothesis 4). The time-varying variable 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐𝑡 measures the rules 
and practices affecting the accessibility, coverage, scope and quality of credit information 
available through information sharing (Quality information sharing). Augmenting the base 
regression (1) with this variable renders: 
 
𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡            (20) 
 
Note that Qualityct is only available for country-years in which banks exchange borrower 
information (i.e., Tct = 1). The value equals zero if there is no information sharing in a specific 
year and country. Based on our model we expect 𝛽1 (𝛽2) to be positive (negative). Very 
effective information sharing ensures that all banks have access to the same comprehensive 
information about loan applicants. This increases the inter-bank correlation in loan decisions 
and dampens the market-size effect of clustering. After all, it becomes less attractive for 
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borrowers to travel to (distant) localities with many branches (as the probability that a loan 
application gets rejected at each branch becomes very similar). In the extreme case, when all 
branches share all information and process these data in the same way, there is no difference 
between having just one branch or having many branches in a locality. Increasingly effective 
information sharing therefore starts to dampen clustering at one point (all else equal). 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Baseline results 
Table 2 presents our baseline results (cf. equations (17) and (18)). For each dependent variable 
– No. branches all banks, Branch same bank, No. branches same bank, and HHI – we show 
three regression outcomes for different proxies of the dependent variables. In the first two 
regressions, we match newly-opened branches with all surrounding pre-existing branches 
within a 2-km or a 5-km radius. In the third specification, we match new branches with all 
existing branches in the same locality. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. 
 In line with our first hypothesis, columns 1-3 show that once a country introduces 
information sharing, banks start to open new branches in localities with more pre-existing 
branches compared to countries where information sharing has not (yet) been introduced. Our 
results are qualitatively similar when matching new branches with existing branches in a 2 (5) 
km radius (columns 1 and 2) or within the same locality (column 3). The impact of a credit 
registry is economically significant: column 3 shows that once information sharing is 
introduced, banks choose to locate new branches in towns and cities that have 55 more pre-
existing bank branches. This is a large effect given that the average locality in our data set 
contains 129 branches.15 
In contrast, and in line with hypothesis 2, columns 4 to 9 show that information sharing 
induces banks to open new branches in localities where they have fewer existing branches of 
their own. This effect is again sizable: after the establishment of information sharing, banks are 
11 percentage points less likely to locate a new branch in cities where they already own one or 
                                                          
15 The dependent variables in columns 1-3 and 7-9 are non-negative integers. When we use a Poisson estimator 
all our results continue to hold at the 1 per cent level. 
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more branches of their own (column 6). The number of pre-existing own branches is reduced 
by almost 3 (the average is 4). 
Lastly, columns 10 to 12 reveal that after the introduction of information sharing banks 
start to open new branches in less concentrated markets – as indicated by a lower HHI index. 
This aligns with our first result. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
5.2. Heterogeneous impacts by bank type 
Not all banks may be equally affected by information sharing. To analyze such heterogeneity, 
we interact in Table 3 the information sharing variable with dummies that identify foreign 
banks (in line with eq. (19)). The first three columns of Table 3 indicate that while information 
sharing affects the clustering of all banks, the impact is significantly stronger for domestic 
banks. For instance, after the establishment of information sharing, domestic banks tend to 
open new branches in localities with 74 more existing branches (compared with the situation 
before information sharing). This number is only 34 (74.39 - 40.88) for foreign banks. 
The first three columns of Table 3 also show that before the introduction of information 
sharing, foreign banks opened branches in localities with more pre-existing branches. That is, 
compared to domestic banks, foreign banks typically added branches to well-established local 
banking markets rather than venturing into new territory. A possible explanation is that 
compared to domestic banks, foreign banks have built up less information about domestic 
clients and therefore mimic the locational choices of domestic competitors. This effect is 
economically significant: foreign banks locate new branches in cities with 84 more pre-existing 
branches. The introduction of information sharing therefore partially levels the playing field 
between foreign and domestic banks: it allows foreign banks to open branches in underserved 
markets that they previously avoided.16 
                                                          
16 In Appendix Table A5 we take this analysis one step further by distinguishing between greenfield and take-
over foreign banks. As expected, the introduction of information sharing is especially beneficial to greenfield 
foreign banks: these relatively young and inexperienced banks cluster less after the introduction of information 
sharing and can spread out their branch networks more widely. 
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Lastly, columns 4-9 in Table 3 show that with information sharing foreign banks tend to 
open branches in new localities where they had no or few branches before. 17  Prior to 
information sharing, foreign banks were more likely than domestic banks to cluster their own 
branches together but, again, the registry appears to allow foreign banks to geographically 
spread out their branch networks. After the establishment of information sharing, foreign banks 
are 4 percentage points less likely than domestic banks to open new branches in a locality with 
prior branches of their own. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
5.3.  Heterogeneous impacts by effectiveness of the information-sharing regime 
Table 4 assesses our fourth hypothesis that in countries with particularly effective information 
sharing, branch clustering will gradually level off.18 More specifically, our model predicts that 
the market-size effect of clustering declines when the inter-bank correlation in loan-rejection 
probabilities increases. The intuition is that banks receive increasingly similar public 
information about applicants and are therefore more likely to make the same lending decisions. 
Note that only in countries with information sharing in place, we can calculate the variable 
Quality information sharing (in countries without information sharing, this variable is zero). 
The first three columns in Table 4 show that, in line with our fourth hypothesis, the presence 
of information sharing leads to more branch clustering but that this increase becomes smaller 
for more effective registries. The results in column 3 indicate that an improvement of the 
registry quality by 2 points (out of 6, about one standard deviation) reduces branch clustering 
due to information sharing from 51 to 38 pre-existing branches per locality. We also construct 
a dummy, Better information sharing, that equals one if the quality of information sharing 
                                                          
17 We also test this at the locality level as shown in Appendix Table A6. Specifically, we generate a dummy, 
Foreign bank existence, that is equal to ‘1’ if there is at least one foreign bank branch in a locality in a specific 
year; and ‘0’ otherwise. The results show that after the introduction of information sharing, localities are more 
likely to have foreign bank branches, which is in line with the prediction that information sharing helps foreign 
banks in particular to expand into new localities. 
18 We only show results for the dependent variable No. branches all banks as this is the only variable for which 
our theoretical model yields a clear prediction for the sign of the coefficient. 
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index ranges between 4 and 6, and zero otherwise. The results in the last three columns indicate 
that although information sharing results in more bank branch clustering, this effect becomes 
smaller or even reverses in countries with very effective information-sharing systems. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
5.4.  Robustness and placebo tests 
We subject our results to various robustness and placebo tests. First, one may worry that the 
introduction of information sharing in a country is endogenous as it reflects unobservable 
national circumstances that also bear directly on branch clustering. We absorb any time-
invariant unobservable variation through country fixed effects, and region-wide time variation 
through year fixed effects. However, we cannot control for unobservable country-specific and 
time-varying variables. We therefore instrument the introduction of information sharing in a 
country and year with the percentage of all neighboring countries that introduced information 
sharing in the past five years (Martinez Peria and Singh, 2014). This instrument builds on the 
notion that financial reforms tend to converge regionally (Abiad and Mody, 2005). The 
exclusion restriction is that the introduction of information sharing in nearby countries only 
has an impact on domestic bank clustering via an increase in the probability that information 
sharing is introduced domestically as well. 
 Table 5 reports our IV outcomes. The first stage shows a strong and positive correlation 
between the introduction of information sharing in neighboring countries in the recent past and 
the introduction of a credit registry or bureau in the country of observation. Both the Cragg-
Donald Wald F-statistic and the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic indicate that our instrument is 
strong.  Moreover, the second-stage estimates are qualitatively very similar to our OLS 
baseline results, suggesting that endogeneity in the introduction of information sharing is not 
driving our results. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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Table 6 reports a battery of robustness tests related to the clustering of standard errors. Our 
baseline approach throughout the paper is to report robust standard errors. Table 6 shows that 
our results hold when clustering standard errors by bank (columns 1-3), country (columns 4-
6), or year (columns 7-9). Moreover, our results go through when clustering standard errors by 
bank*locality (each bank can have several observations in the same locality if it opens branches 
in that locality at different points in time, columns 10-12), by country*year (columns 13-15), 
or by bank*year (columns 16-18). 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Finally, Table 7 reports a placebo test. For each year, we keep the same number of information 
sharing introductions but instead of using the actual event countries, we assume that 
information sharing was introduced in another country group of the same size. This placebo 
country group is chosen randomly out of the total set of countries that at that point in time had 
not (yet) introduced information sharing. This approach thus preserves the cross-country trend 
in information sharing introductions, but randomly reallocates these events from the actual to 
placebo countries. We repeat this random reallocation 500 times and report the average 
estimation results. As expected, the results disappear in this placebo test, suggesting that it is 
unlikely that our results reflect unobservable characteristics or linear trends. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
5.5. Extension: Information sharing and geographical credit rationing 
An important model prediction that we have not yet been able to test with our branch-level data 
is that the introduction of information sharing reduces spatial credit rationing: firms will be 
able to borrow from more distant bank branches. To empirically test this prediction, we merge 
our branch data with information from the Kompass database on firm-bank relationships. 
Kompass provides firm-level data including address, industry, and – critically for our purposes 
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– the primary bank relationship(s) (see also Giannetti and Ongena, 2012 and Ongena, Peydró 
and Van Horen, 2015). We have these data for the years 2000 and 2005. 
We collect the geographical coordinates of the firms in Kompass based on their name and 
address and identify the name of their primary bank. We then match each Kompass firm to all 
the branches from their primary lender (using BEPS II information) and calculate the distance 
from the firm to each of these branches. We then assume that firms borrow from the nearest 
branch of their primary bank and use this nearest distance as the Firm-branch distance in 
kilometers. 
Of all countries in Kompass, there are four that introduced information sharing between 
2000 and 2005 and that are also included in our BEPS data: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
and Poland. Because the bank information in Kompass and in BEPS can only be matched 
poorly for Estonia and Latvia, we focus on the Czech Republic and Poland. These countries 
introduced information sharing in 2002 and 2001, respectively. We also include two countries 
that did not introduce information sharing between 2000 and 2005. There are four such BEPS 
countries (Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Ukraine) but because the matching of bank 
information is very poor for Slovakia and Ukraine we focus on the first two. We thus compare 
the change in firm-branch distance between 2000 and 2005 in two countries that introduced 
information sharing during this period (the Czech Republic and Poland) with the change in 
firm-branch distance in two similar countries that did not (Croatia and Hungary). The final 
merged data set contains 9,348 and 4,960 firm records in 2000 and 2005, respectively, across 
these four countries. 
The upper panel of Table 8 shows summary statistics and a two-sample t-test with unequal 
variances. In the countries that introduced information sharing between 2000 and 2005 (the 
Czech Republic and Poland), firms on average borrow from more distant bank branches in 
2005 than in 2000 (2 km and 8 km further for the Czech Republic and Poland, respectively). 
In contrast, firms do not borrow from more distant branches in the two comparator countries 
that did not introduce information sharing during this period (Croatia and Hungary). We also 
test this more formally in a differences-in-differences regression framework (lower panel of 
Table 8). Column (1) shows that after the introduction of information sharing, firms borrow 
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from branches that are around 15 km further away as compared to firms in countries that did 
not introduce information sharing during the same period. 
If information sharing reduces geographical credit rationing, allowing firms to borrow from 
more distant bank branches, then we expect this to be particularly important for relatively 
opaque firms. For these firms, information asymmetries were initially more of an issue and the 
new publicly available information will therefore have more ‘bite’. To test whether this is 
indeed the case, we use the Kompass data to construct three dummy variables that proxy for a 
firm’s opaqueness. These are whether the firm has a publicly available email address (Has 
email address), whether the firm has a tax number (Has tax number) and whether the firm has 
formal opening/working hours (Has formal opening hours). We then use these opaqueness 
proxies to construct triple interaction terms with Information sharing. Each model is fully 
saturated with additional (unreported) interaction terms between the country and year fixed 
effects and the respective opaqueness proxy. 
Columns 2, 3, and 4 show the results. We find that the effect of information sharing on the 
reduction in spatial credit rationing is about twice as large for relatively opaque firms as 
compared with more transparent firms. For instance, while the average effect of information 
sharing is an increase in the firm-bank distance of 15.1 km (column 1), column 2 shows that 
this effect is 19.2 km for opaque firms (here proxied as those without an email address) and 
only 11.3 for less opaque firms (with an email address). Because of these differential impacts, 
opaque and less opaque firms partially converge in terms of the geographical radius within 
which they can successfully seek out attractive borrowing opportunities. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
It is well known that branches of different banks tend to cluster spatially. Yet, to date there 
exists surprisingly little theoretical and empirical research on the drivers of this phenomenon. 
Our contribution is to use the introduction of information sharing regimes as plausibly 
exogenous shocks that shift the relative advantages and disadvantages of branch clustering. We 
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then observe how these shocks play out at a very disaggregated level (that of individual villages, 
towns, and cities) across a variety of countries. 
We start by building a simple spatial oligopoly model of branch clustering. The model 
focuses on the trade-off between the market-size effect and the price-cutting effect of branch 
clustering. It predicts that the establishment of information sharing will stimulate clustering 
due to an increase in competition from far-away bank branches. The model also predicts that 
after the introduction of information sharing, banks will be less likely to open additional 
branches in locations where they already have a presence. Finally, our model indicates that 
more effective information sharing systems will gradually dampen bank branch clustering. 
In the empirical part of the paper, we then test these theoretical predictions by exploiting 
dynamic information on the geographical locations of bank branches. We find that the 
establishment of information sharing has a significantly positive impact on bank clustering and 
that this impact is larger for domestic banks. We also show that after the establishment of 
information sharing banks are more likely to locate new branches in “virgin” localities (that is, 
where they did not have a branch presence yet). As a result of these changes, the average firm 
is able to borrow from more distant bank branches. Finally, we establish that countries with 
more efficient credit information sharing systems start to exhibit less pronounced bank 
clustering. 
Taken together, our results show that branch clustering is a function of the public 
availability of trustworthy borrower information. When such information is more broadly 
available, banks – especially new players such as foreign-owned banks – can expand their 
branch network to new localities that they would previously have avoided. At the same time, 
it becomes more important for banks to cluster together as a higher local variety of banks makes 
it easier to attract distant customers. Together, these effects mean that banking markets become 
more homogenous in terms of composition – as they are served by the same banks that now 
operate across the country – but less homogenous in terms of size. While the public availability 
of information sharing leads to further clustering of banks in well-served locations, other 
(smaller) locations may lose out as access to credit deteriorates further. Assessing the real-
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economic impacts of such spatial variation in access to credit due to information sharing is a 
promising avenue for further research. 
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Variable Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max.
Year of branch opening 33,716 2004 2005 4.06 1995 2012
Year of bank establishment 33,716 1992 1992 14.26 1873 2011
Dependent variables
No. branches all banks w/i 2 km 33,716 90 17 202 0 1,575
No. branches all banks w/i 5 km 33,716 110 23 209 0 1,575
No. branches all banks w/i same locality 33,716 129 25 232 0 1,574
Branch same bank w/i 2 km 33,716 0.33 0 0.47 0 1
Branch same bank w/i 5 km 33,716 0.37 0 0.48 0 1
Branch same bank w/i same locality 33,716 0.38 0 0.49 0 1
No. branches same bank w/i 2 km 33,716 3 0 9.35 0 202
No. branches same bank w/i 5 km 33,716 3 0 10.12 0 202
No. branches same bank w/i same locality 33,716 4 0 11.95 0 202
HHI w/i 2 km 33,716 0.21 0.13 0.24 0 1
HHI w/i 5 km 33,716 0.21 0.13 0.24 0 1
HHI w/i same locality 33,716 0.22 0.14 0.24 0 1
Independent variables
Information sharing 33,716 0.55 1 0.50 0 1
Quality information sharing 17,807 1.45 0 2.16 0 6
Branch by foreign bank 33,716 0.44 0 0.50 0 1
Branch by greenfield foreign bank 33,716 0.14 0 0.35 0 1
Foreign bank existence 162,648 0.38 0 0.48 0 1
Has email address 14,308 0.60 1 0.49 0 1
Has tax number 14,308 0.74 1 0.44 0 1
Has formal opening hours 14,308 0.74 1 0.44 0 1
Summary Statistics
This table provides the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for all
variables used in the analysis.
Table 1
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Dependent variable →
2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Information sharing 84.32*** 69.91*** 55.45*** -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.67*** -1.51*** -2.68*** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.02***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.023) (0.000)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Adjusted) R-squared 0.212 0.177 0.147 0.111 0.115 0.118 0.053 0.054 0.076 0.065 0.059 0.057
Observations 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716
Table 2
Information Sharing and the Geographical Clustering of Bank Branches
This table reports OLS and probit (columns 4-6) regressions to estimate the impact of the introduction of information sharing on subsequent bank branch clustering. 
Table A1 contains all definitions and Table 1 the summary statistics for each variable. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the
1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively.
No. branches all banks w/i Branch same bank w/i No. branches same bank w/i HHI w/i
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Dependent variable →
2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Information sharing 112.51*** 95.18*** 74.39*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.09*** 0.31 -0.77*** -2.30*** 0.02*** 0.01* -0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.167) (0.002) (0.000) (0.008) (0.090) (0.962)
Branch by foreign banks 79.38*** 83.68*** 84.30*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.24 0.10 -0.22 0.04*** 0.01*** 0.01
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.124) (0.550) (0.243) (0.000) (0.001) (0.107)
Information sharing * Branch by foreign bank -60.29*** -54.19*** -40.88** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -2.05*** -1.56*** -0.80*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(Adjusted) R-squared 0.223 0.190 0.160 0.112 0.116 0.118 0.056 0.056 0.076 0.068 0.061 0.059
Observations 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 3
Information Sharing and the Geographical Clustering of Foreign Bank Branches
This table reports OLS and probit (columns 4-6) regressions to estimate the impact of the introduction of information sharing on subsequent bank branch clustering by foreign banks versus
domestic banks. Table A1 contains all definitions and Table 1 the summary statistics for each variable. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level of significance, respectively.
No. branches all banks w/i Branch same bank w/i No. branches same bank w/i HHI w/i
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Dependent variable →
2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Information sharing 75.30*** 64.90*** 51.48*** 65.36*** 49.55*** 35.11***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Information sharing * Quality information sharing -5.17*** -5.72*** -6.55***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Information sharing * Better information sharing -50.39*** -54.13*** -54.07***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.195 0.151 0.109 0.214 0.180 0.150
Observations 17,807 17,807 17,807 17,807 17,807 17,807
No. branches all banks w/i
This table reports OLS regressions to estimate the impact of the introduction of information sharing and of the quality of this information
sharing system on subsequent bank branch clustering. The dependent variables measure the pre-existing branch structure in each locality
where a new bank branch is opened. Table A1 contains all definitions and Table 1 the summary statistics for each variable. Robust p-values
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively.
Quality of Information Sharing and Bank Branch Clustering
Table 4
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First stage
Dependent variable →
2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
0.28*** - - - - - - - - - - - -
(0.000) - - - - - - - - - - - -
Information sharing - 139.84*** 67.66*** 9.79 -0.37*** -0.21** -0.31*** -5.86*** -9.30*** -12.27*** -0.10** -0.11*** -0.14***
- (0.000) (0.000) (0.745) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.008) (0.001)
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 511.52 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 317.05 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Adjusted) R-squared 0.771 0.207 0.177 0.145 0.0889 0.1119 0.1079 0.0347 0.0198 0.0385 0.0570 0.0495 0.0437
Observations 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716
% neighboring countries that 
introduced information sharing in the 
past 5 years
No. branches all banks w/iInformation 
sharing
This table reports IV regressions to estimate the impact of the introduction of information sharing on subsequent bank branch clustering. The instrument in the first stage is the percentage of 
neighboring countries that introduced information sharing in the previous five years. Table A1 contains all definitions and Table 1 the summary statistics for each variable. Robust p-values are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively.
Robustness: IV framework
Table 5
Branch same bank w/i No. branches same bank w/i HHI w/i
Second stage
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Dependent variable →
2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Information sharing 84.32*** 69.91*** 55.45*** 84.32*** 69.91** 55.45* 84.32** 69.91** 55.45*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.009) (0.027) (0.062) (0.015) (0.032) (0.064)
Clustering Standard Errors Bank Bank Bank Country Country Country Year Year Year
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.212 0.178 0.148 0.053 0.054 0.076 0.065 0.059 0.057
Observations 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716
Dependent variable →
2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Information sharing 84.32*** 69.91*** 55.45*** 84.32*** 69.91*** 55.45*** 84.32*** 69.91*** 55.45***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Clustering Standard Errors Bank*Locality Bank*Locality Bank*Locality Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Bank*Year Bank*Year Bank*Year
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.212 0.177 0.147 0.212 0.177 0.147 0.212 0.177 0.147
Observations 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716
Table 6
Robustness: Clustering of Standard Errors
This table reports OLS regressions to estimate the impact of the introduction of information sharing on subsequent bank branch clustering. Standard errors are clustered by bank
(columns 1-3), country (columns 4-6), year (columns 7-9), bank*locality (columns 10-12), country and year (columns 13-15) or bank and year (columns 16-18). Table A1
contains all definitions and Table 1 the summary statistics for each variable. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of
significance, respectively.
No. branches all banks w/i
No. branches all banks w/i
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Dependent variable →
2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Information sharing -4.40 -3.57 -2.71 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.08 -0.08 -0.00 -0.00
(0.177) (0.357) (0.592) (0.779) (0.738) (0.712) (0.732) (0.969) (0.752) (0.741) (0.713) (0.765)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Adjusted) R-squared 0.202 0.171 0.144 0.111 0.115 0.118 0.053 0.054 0.076 0.065 0.059 0.057
Observations 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716
Table 7
Placebo Test: Random Introduction of Information Sharing Across Countries
This table reports placebo OLS regressions to estimate the impact of the introduction of information sharing on subsequent bank branch clustering. The dependent
variables measure the pre-existing branch structure in each locality where a new bank branch is opened. For each year we keep the actual number of credit registry
introductions but instead of using the actual countries that introduced information sharing in that year, we use the same number of placebo countries (randomly
picked from the total set of countries that in that year had not (yet) introduced information sharing). We repeat this randomization and estimation 500 times and
present average results. Table A1 contains all definitions and Table 1 the summary statistics for each variable. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
* correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively.
No. branches all banks w/i Branch same bank w/i No. branches same bank w/i HHI w/i
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Czech Republic (Introduced information sharing in 2002) Poland (Introduced information sharing in 2001)
Obs. Mean St. Dev. 5% 95% Obs. Mean St. Dev. 5% 95%
2000 1,650 3.01 5.16 2.76 3.26 2000 5,286 19.13 56.57 17.60 20.65
2005 1,892 5.01 14.02 4.38 5.64 2005 1,242 27.22 68.88 23.38 31.05
2005-2000 2.00*** 2005-2000 8.09***
Croatia (Introduced information sharing in 2007) Hungary (Introduced information sharing in 1995)
Obs. Mean St. Dev. 5% 95% Obs. Mean St. Dev. 5% 95%
2000 953 16.65 48.97 13.54 19.77 2000 1,459 24.08 34.51 22.31 25.85
2005 409 20.92 47.43 16.31 25.53 2005 1,417 8.54 13.65 7.83 9.25
2005-2000 4.26 2005-2000 -15.54***
Difference-in-Difference (-in-Difference) regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Information sharing 15.14*** 19.15*** 21.02*** 19.48***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Information sharing*Has email address -7.89***
(0.001)
Information sharing*Has tax number -15.77***
(0.003)
Information sharing*Has formal opening hours -11.63***
(0.000)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Adjusted) R-squared 0.027 0.029 0.029 0.028
Observations 14,308 14,308 14,308 14,308
Dependent variable → Firm-branch distance (in km)
This table reports, by country, summary statistics for the variable Firm-branch distance and OLS regressions to estimate the impact of the introduction of information sharing
on spatial credit rationing. All diff-in-diff-in-diff regressions in the lower panel are fully saturated with additional (unreported) interaction effects between the year and country
dummies and the firm characteristics. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively.
Information Sharing and Spatial Credit Rationing
Table 8
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Figure 1
Bank Branch Dynamics in the U.S. and Europe: 2001-2014
These charts show the development of the total number of bank branches by country. If a foreign bank has several branches in a host country then these are counted as a single branch in
the case of European countries (in line with ECB methodology). Source: FDIC and ECB.
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This figure presents comparative statics based on a calibration of our theoretical model that assumes no
overlap among nearby bank localities. We assume that the probability of loan rejection is 70 per cent; the
minimal loan rate is 2 percent; the oligopoly rent is 2 percent; the project return is 10 per cent; the
commuting cost coefficient is 1 per cent; the correlation among bank branches of the loan-rejection
probability is 0.2; and the commuting cost of applying for a loan in a distant locality is 6. There are 10
bank branches in the distant locality w . The vertical axis presents the expected profit of each bank
branch and the horizontal axis shows the number of bank branches. Darker (lighter) shades indicate that
the expected profit of opening a new branch in locality d is larger (smaller) than the expected profit
(shown by the first column at the very left) of opening a new branch in a new locality without pre-
existing branches. Before the establishment of information sharing, banks cluster together until there are
6 branches in locality d. The expected profit of each of these 6 branches is still higher than the expected
profit of operating alone (which is just above 40). Adding a 7th branch would, however, push expected
profit below the profit that could be had when opening that additional branch in a new locality instead.
After the introduction of information sharing (which introduces competition from distant bank localities)
branch clustering increases significantly to 16 (until the profit of operating alone is higher than
clustering).
 No Overlap Among Bank Localities
Branch Clustering after the Establishment of Information Sharing
Figure 2
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Branch Clustering after the Establishment of Information Sharing
 Overlap Among Bank Localities
This figure presents comparative statics based on a calibration of our theoretical model that assumes
overlap among nearby bank localities. We assume that the probability of loan rejection is 70 per cent; the
minimal loan rate is 2 percent; the oligopoly rent is 2 percent; the project return is 10 per cent; the
commuting cost coefficient is 1 per cent; the correlation among bank branches of the loan-rejection
probability is 0.2; and the commuting cost of applying for a loan in a distant locality is 6. There are 10
bank branches in the distant locality w . The number of bank branches in locality s is 20 and the distance
m between locality d and s is 12. The vertical axis presents the expected profit of each bank branch and
the horizontal axis shows the number of bank branches. Darker (lighter) shades indicate that the expected
profit  of opening a new branch in locality d  (shown by the first  column at the very left) is larger (smaller) 
than the expected profit of opening such a branch in a new locality without pre-existing branches. Before
the establishment of information sharing, banks cluster together until there are 4 branches in locality d . 
The expected profit of each of these 4 branches is still higher than the expected profit of operating alone
(which is just above 40). Adding a 5th branch would, however, push expected profit below the profit that
could be had when opening that additional branch in a new locality instead. After the introduction of
information sharing (which introduces competition from distant bank localities) branch clustering
increases significantly to 14 (until the profit  of operating alone is higher than clustering).
Figure 3
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This figure analyzes the difference between the impact of information sharing on domestic and
foreign banks. Information sharing reduces the cost of screening distant borrowers from 6.5 to 6 for
domestic banks and from 6.2 to 6 for foreign banks. The introduction of information sharing
therefore induces more branch clustering by domestic banks than by foreign banks. Dark (light) bars
show results without (with) overlap among nearby localities.
The Impact of Information Sharing on Domestic and Foreign Banks
Figure 4
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
-0.50 -0.20
C
h
a
n
ge
 i
n
 t
h
e 
eq
u
il
ib
ri
u
m
 n
u
m
b
er
 
o
f 
b
ra
n
ch
es
Change in cost of screening distant borrowers
Domestic banks
Foreign banks
46 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure shows the declining equilibrium level of branch clustering when the inter-branch correlation of loan-
rejection rates increases as information sharing systems become more effective (from 0.2 to 0.3). Bank branch
clustering decreases when the quality of information sharing increases (with higher correlation among bnaks in
loca rejection decisions).
Quality of Information Sharing
Figure 5
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Distribution of Localities with Bank Branches in 1995 and in 2012
Panel A. This map plots all localities in our dataset with at least one bank branch in 1995. Source: BEPS II survey.
Panel B. This map plots all localities in our dataset with at least one bank branch in 2012. Source: BEPS II survey.
Figure 6
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The first two charts show the trend in the number of pre-existing branches of the same bank and all
banks, respectively, within a 2 km radius around newly opened branches in the four years before and
the four years after the establishment of information sharing at t=0. The third chart shows the same
for the HHI index in the 2 km around newly opened branched. Table A1 contains all variable
definitions.
Branch Clustering Before and During Information Sharing
Figure 7
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Variable Name Definition Data Sources
Year of branch opening The year a bank branch was opened BEPS II
Year of bank establishment The year a bank was established or entered a country (either as a greenfield establishment or by taking over an existing bank) Various sources
Dependent variables
No. branches all banks w/i x km Number of existing branches of all banks within a radius 2 or 5 kilometres around the new branch BEPS II
No. branches all banks w/i same locality Number of existing branches of all banks within the same locality of the new branch BEPS II
Branch same bank w/i x km = 1 if there is an existing branch of the same bank within a radius of 2 or 5 kilometers around the new branch, = 0 otherwise BEPS II
Branch same bank w/i same locality = 1 if there is an existing branch of the same bank within the same locality of the new branch, = 0 otherwise BEPS II
No. branches same bank w/i x km Number of existing branches of the same bank within a radius of 2 or 5 kilometres around the new branch BEPS II
No. branches same bank w/i same locality Number of existing branches of the same bank within the same locality of the new branch BEPS II
HHI w/i x km Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of bank concentration within a radius of 2 or 5 kilometers around the new branch BEPS II
HHI w/i same locality Herfindahl Hirschman Index of bank concentration within the same locality of the new branch BEPS II
Independent variables
Information sharing = 1 if there is information sharing in the country in that year, = 0 otherwise Various sources
Quality information sharing = 0 to 6, measures the quality of information sharing in the country Doing Business
Branch by foreign bank = 1 if the new branch is opened by a foreign bank, = 0 otherwise Claessens and Van Horen (2014)
Branch by greenfield foreign bank = 1 if the new branch is opened by a foreign greenfield bank, = 0 otherwise Claessens and Van Horen (2014)
Foreign bank existence = 1 if there is at least one foreign bank branch in a locality in a specific year; = 0 otherwise BEPS II
Has email address = 1 if the firm has an email address; = 0 otherwise Kompass
Has tax number = 1 if the firm has a tax number; = 0 otherwise Kompass
Has formal opening hours = 1 if the firm has listed formal opening hours in Kompass; = 0 otherwise Kompass
Variable Definitions and Sources
This table provides the definition and data sources for all variables used in the analysis. BEPS II is the second round of the EBRD Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS) which was conducted in 32
countries among 611 banks. "Own calculations" indicates authors' own calculations based on BEPS II; "Doing Business" is the Doing Business Database by the World Bank.
Table A1
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Year of 
branch 
opening
Year of 
bank 
establish
ment
No. 
branches 
all banks 
w/i same 
locality
Branch 
same 
bank w/i 
same 
locality
No. 
branches 
same 
bank w/i 
same 
locality
HHI w/i 
same city
Informati
on 
sharing
Quality 
informati
on 
sharing
Branch 
by 
foreign 
bank
Branch 
by 
greenfield 
foreign 
bank
Year of branch opening 1.0000
Year of bank establishment 0.0569 1.0000
(0.000)
No. branches all banks w/i same locality 0.2416 0.1453 1.0000
(0.000) (0.000)
Branch same bank w/i same locality 0.2755 -0.1306 0.3205 1.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. branches same bank w/i same locality 0.1822 -0.1146 0.3605 0.4413 1.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HHI w/i same city -0.0410 -0.0351 -0.2423 -0.1073 -0.1158 1.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Information sharing 0.5974 0.0862 0.2077 0.0860 0.0965 -0.0575 1.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Quality information sharing 0.2427 -0.0383 -0.0280 0.0143 -0.0040 -0.0709 0.1281 1.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.462) (0.000) (0.000)
Branch by foreign bank -0.0275 0.0236 0.0743 -0.0119 0.0009 -0.0302 0.1996 0.0961 1.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.872) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Branch by greenfield foreign bank -0.0576 0.2605 0.0637 -0.1306 -0.0881 -0.0666 0.1282 0.0556 0.4656 1.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correlation Matrix
This table reports a correlation matrix for our main variables. Tables A1 and 1 contain all definitions and summary statistics, respectively. Correlation 
coefficients (p-values) are listed in the first (second) row.
Table A2
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1995 2,391 0 Albania 443 11
1996 490 0 Armenia 448 19
1997 603 0 Azerbaijan 335 13
1998 552 0 Belarus 2,481 9
1999 555 0 Bosnia 617 10
2000 987 6 Bulgaria 1,405 100
2001 1,440 3 Croatia 608 48
2002 1,440 11 Czech Rep. 382 19
2003 2,735 10 Estonia 60 56
2004 4,675 36 Georgia 703 108
2005 2,391 24 Hungary 1,538 287
2006 2,700 25 Latvia 195 9
2007 7,999 66 Lithuania 94 0
2008 1,928 111 Macedonia 189 16
2009 665 269 Moldova 1,300 180
2010 789 272 Montenegro 206 12
2011 1,095 287 Poland 3,192 51
2012 281 248 Romania 2,053 177
Serbia 1,080 227
Slovakia 153 0
Slovenia 157 16
Ukraine 16,077 0
Total 33,716 1,368 Total 33,716 1,368
Country Opened 
branches
Closed 
branches
Table A3
Overview of Branch Openings and Closures
This table provides an overview of the opening and closure of branches in our
dataset by year (left) and by country (right).
Year Opened 
branches
Closed 
branches
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Country Public Credit Registry Private Credit Bureau
Albania 2008 2009
Armenia 2003 2004
Azerbaijan 2005 n.a.
Belarus 2007 n.a.
Bosnia 2006 2001
Bulgaria 1999 2005
Croatia n.a. 2007
Czech Republic 2002 2002
Estonia n.a. 2001
Georgia n.a. 2005
Hungary n.a. 1995
Latvia 2003 n.a.
Lithuania 1995 2003
Macedonia 1998 2010
Moldova n.a. 2011
Montenegro 2008 n.a.
Poland n.a. 2001
Romania 2000 2004
Serbia 2002 2004
Slovak Republic 1997 2004
Slovenia 1994 2008
Ukraine n.a. 2007
Introduction of Information Sharing
This table provides an overview of the introduction years of public
credit registries and private credit bureaus in our 22 sample countries.
N.a.: No credit bureau or registry has as yet been introduced in this
country. Source: World Bank Doing Business Database, EBRD and
various publications and websites.
Table A4
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Dependent variable →
2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality 2 km 5 km Locality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Information sharing 105.85*** 87.99*** 68.01*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.06*** 0.12 -0.73*** -2.02*** 0.00 -0.00 -0.01**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.541) (0.001) (0.000) (0.814) (0.978) (0.036)
Branch by greenfield foreign bank 73.81*** 84.76*** 94.00*** -0.02** -0.03*** -0.03*** -1.17*** -1.27*** -1.53*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Branch by M&A foreign bank 68.93*** 69.51*** 67.00*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.55*** 0.58*** 0.40** 0.03*** 0.01 -0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.045) (0.000) (0.109) (0.415)
Information sharing * Branch by greenfield foreign bank -50.92*** -47.72*** -40.17*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.80*** -1.43*** -2.10*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Information sharing * Branch by M&A foreign bank -54.51*** -45.30*** -30.72*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -2.30*** -1.50*** -0.13 -0.02** -0.00 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.677) (0.015) (0.477) (0.508)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Adjusted) R-squared 0.2240 0.1911 0.1609 0.1206 0.1273 0.1262 0.0571 0.0586 0.0825 0.0713 0.0632 0.0608
Observations 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716 33,716
Table A5
Information Sharing and the Geographical Clustering of Greenfield Foreign Bank Branches
This table reports OLS and probit (columns 4-6) regressions to estimate the impact of the introduction of information sharing on subsequent bank branch clustering by greenfield foreign banks. Table
A1 contains all definitions and Table 1 the summary statistics for each variable. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance,
respectively.
No. branches all banks w/i Branch same bank w/i No. branches same bank w/i HHI w/i
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Dependent variable →
(1) (2)
Information sharing 0.007* 0.017**
(0.052) (0.000)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.453 0.445
Observations 162,648 135,287
Table A6
Information Sharing and the 
Geographical Expansion of Foreign 
This table reports OLS regressions to estimate the impact
of the introduction of information sharing on the
geographical expansion of foreign bank branches. In
column 1, the sample includes all localites in all the years.
even thoses with 0 bank branches. Column 2 excludes
these 0 bank branches locality-year observations. Table
A1 contains all definitions and Table 1 the summary
statistics for each variable. Robust p-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and
10% level of significance, respectively.
Foreign bank existence
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Impact of Information Sharing on Branch Clustering without Overlap of Bank Localities
Figure A1
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Impact of Information Sharing on Branch Clustering with Overlap of Bank Localities
Figure A2
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